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Introduction
Consumer preference to purchase from "green" firms is well established. It is often revealed through increased willingness to pay for products viewed as "clean," i.e., produced with environmentally-friendly production or abatement technologies such as recycling or use of less polluting inputs. From the firm's perspective, even in the absence of willingness to pay effects, there may be reason for investment in these technologies if public opinion becomes more favorable toward the firm, or the firm uses its investment as a way of differentiating its product. A firm may therefore invest even in the absence of government investment incentives. Investment in environmentally clean or "green" technologies has recently given firms the right to attach a specific "ecolabel" to their product. Well-known examples include dolphinsafe tuna, green electricity, low environmental impact washing powders, and forest product certification (e.g., see Sterner 2001, Ch. 2 for a review of ecolabeling and green technologies).
These ecolabels are a potentially important strategic variable, serving to differentiate the firm's product, in imperfectly competitive markets, from those produced by firms that do not make the necessary green investments. This suggests that ecolabeling might be studied within the confines of product quality competition models. Quality competition is usually analyzed within a duopoly framework under the assumption of vertical product differentiation, where firms compete by choosing both product quality and prices for their products.
1
The quality competition literature, however, omits an important feature of ecolabeling.
Namely, in order to obtain the labeling rights and then provide (environmental) quality at a level required by the ecolabel, a firm must usually first invest in a cleaner production technology. These investments can typically be very costly in terms of capital (Kemp 1997). But they are important in determining how well the firm can produce goods with high implicit environmental quality. As a result the investment decision should be important both in understanding competition and product differentiation among firms, and in understanding policies to encourage efficient levels of ecolabeling or green technology investment.
1 See e.g. Crampes and Hollander 1995 and Ronnen 1991 for general models, and Arora and Gangopadhyay 1995a for application to environmental quality. There are surprisingly few analytical treatments on eco-labeling, despite that it is becoming more and more common among industries. Matto and Singh (1994) discuss circumstances under which eco-labels are profitable to firms, and Swallow and Sedjo (2000) provide a graphical analysis of mandatory eco-labeling. There is also a growing discussion concerning 'green labeling' in natural resource markets, but this work has been descriptive (see Kiker and Putz 1997, and Ozanne and Smith 1998) .
The purpose of this paper is to examine eco-labeling by including an initial investment stage within the usual duopoly model of vertical product differentiation. Our basic assumptions follow product differentiation models, i.e., there exists both a "low" and "high" quality firm.
These firms differ with respect to effort, and costs, incurred to provide high environmental quality through their production processes. Other assumptions consistent with the quality competition literature are that consumers can observe levels of environmental quality, and in our case adoption of a green technology by the firms. The market is also assumed to be fully covered, in the sense that all consumers purchase positive quantities. However, we allow for consumer willingness to pay to depend on investments. A three stage game is analyzed. In the first stage, the firms decide how much to invest in the green technology needed to obtain an ecolabel right. In the second stage firms compete by choosing the level of environmental quality that results from production of their goods. The third stage has firms competing by choosing prices for their (quality) differentiated product. The inclusion of the investment stage makes our model distinct from the traditional vertical differentiation model. 2 Our results rely on differences in investment incentives between high and low quality firms. Many of these results are new to product differentiation models. We show that all firms may have incentives to invest in technologies and obtain ecolabels. These incentives are reinforced, but only for the high quality firm, if eco-labels increase consumer marginal willingness to pay for environmental quality. The most striking results follow from comparing firms' profit maximizing behavior with various social optima. Although the previous literature focuses only on (product) quality provision and not specifically technology investment, it has established that minimum quality regulations may create incentives for high quality firms to voluntarily overcomply, producing too much quality when maximizing profits. 3 Thus, there is little need for government intervention in these models. The ecolabeling case is similar to quality regulation, because ecolabels require that certain investments must be made in order to 2 There has been some work in product differentiation that considers a three stage game where the firms' entry decisions represent the first stage, followed by quality and price competition (Cremer and Thisse 1999 , Shaked and Sutton 1982 , Lahmandi-Ayed 2000 . Although this appears similar, our model is different in that the first stage investment decision affects costs in the second stage of providing environmental quality. Later, we will show how this effect of investment on costs is important to our results. 3 See e.g. Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995a) for an analysis of overcompliance in a duopoly model of vertical product differentiation without investment, and (1995b) for an analysis of firms' participation in EPA's voluntary environmental programs within the U.S. Crampes and Hollander (1995) analyze the welfare effects of minimum quality requirements, showing that under some conditions consumers may benefit from setting a minimum quality standard.
obtain the right to label a good. That said, our inclusion of a green technology choice leads us to a new result in the presence of environmental externalities associated with low environmental quality. We show that high quality firms may in fact not overinvest or overprovide environmental quality when they maximize profits, relative to the social optimum.
Instead, the behavior of firms hinges on comparing rents from increasing market share versus the cost of green technology investment. The scope for government intervention in our model is quite different than shown in existing models. Essentially the different results in this paper arise primarily because a) technology investment is important in achieving high quality levels and also provides a means for differentiating a firm's product, and b) technology investment is costly.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we develop a model of vertical product differentiation which allows for investment in eco-labeling as a precursor to price and environmental quality competition. The price, quality and technology investment stages are analyzed in Section 3. In Section 4 we examine the social welfare optimum and compare it with the market solution, and we introduce the presence of an externality. In Section 5 we examine extensions of the model for different types of cost functions, and finally, in Section 6 we offer our conclusions.
An Extended Model with Price, Quality and Investment Competition
In this section we outline a market where a duopoly industry produces differentiated products. A word about language is needed before proceeding. We will speak throughout of "investment in environmental quality" and "investment in green technologies" interchangeably.
Any mention of investment will refer to firms' choices of investment levels in a green technology used to produce goods. We will also speak of "provision of environmental quality", or "environmental quality" of goods. Any mention of quality will refer to firms' choices regarding the level of environmental quality that results when they produce goods, for a given technology investment.
Recall the three stages of the game: The firms decide in the first stage how much to invest in the green technology. In the second stage firms compete by choosing the level of environmental quality for their goods. The first two stages are distinct decisions, yet they are of course related in that technology investment will affect costs of attaining different quality levels. The third stage has firms competing by choosing prices for their (quality) differentiated product. This subgame perfect equilibrium relies on commitment by the firm regarding investment and quality. Commitment to investment in a technology is not a problem, given the fact that installing capital is commonly regarded as a credible means of commitment in the Dixit -Spence sense (e.g., see Spence, 1977 or Dixit, 1980 .
Basic Assumptions
Consider a vertically differentiated market, where all consumers benefit when the level of a product's characteristic is augmented in product space. Vertical differentiation is consistent with assuming consumer i has a utility function u i of the following form (see Tirole 1988, pp 96-97, 296-298) ,
where k s and k p are, respectively, the environmental quality and price of a good of quality k. We will assume there are two possible environmental qualities of goods corresponding to two types of firms, k = H (high quality) and k = L (low quality). We will therefore interpret°i as each consumer's marginal willingness to pay for environmental quality k s ; it may also be interpreted as the reciprocal of the marginal utility of income. A standard assumption in the product differentiation literature is to assume marginal willingness to pay for quality is uniformly distributed on a definite interval, ξ ζ°°°, i (e.g., see Cremer and Thisse 1999, pp 562) . We initially assume that °i is not a function of firms' investment levels, so that the interval endpoints are exogenous (we relax this later).
When a market is fully covered, each consumer who enters the market purchases one unit of the good, so that each °i corresponds to a single consumer. 
where I k denotes investment in a technology by a firm of type k ( = H,L), and 0
Investment in the technology therefore decreases the cost of quality provision. To allow this investment effect to differ for the two firms, we assume ) ( ) (
. This means the marginal decrease in costs due to investment is greater for the high-quality firm, as one would expect.
Assuming variable costs of production, the profit functions of both firms can finally be written,
Price and Quality Competition
Working backwards through induction, we first turn to the third stage, in which firms choose prices subject to their previous choices for technology investment and level of 4 Recall in (2) that investment affects costs of providing quality that are independent of the firm's quality level. If we were to use a slightly different cost function, where
, then investment would affect costs of quality provision that depend on the level of quality. We can show use of this cost function does not change our results concerning environmental quality provision or price competition, or the comparisons between the social planner and duopoly, developed later. Details are available from the authors. environmental quality provided for their product. It is straightforward to obtain the reaction functions of the firms and solve for optimal prices in the Bertrand sense, i.e.,
We can see from (4a)-(4b) that the price difference observed in the market depends on the quality difference from the second stage game, L H s s ϑ , and the cost of providing environmental quality, b. The number of consumers in the market, through ° and °, are also important. Notice that the last RHS term in brackets of (4a) and (4b) implies that both firms can increase prices by differentiating their product with respect to environmental quality.
To characterize the second stage, where firms choose environmental quality, we substitute the optimal prices (4a) and (4b) into the profit functions (3) to obtain profit for each firm as a function of environmental quality provision levels, s H and s L . We can show that the resulting Nash equilibrium in qualities is stable, and that the product qualities are strategic complements, i.e., the marginal change in one firm's profit is directly related to the other firm's quality level. Specifically, Nash equilibrium qualities for each firm are given by,
so that,
where
. The environmental quality difference between high and low cost firms therefore depends on the upper and lower bounds of marginal willingness to pay (°and °), and on the marginal costs of producing quality via the parameter b. As these costs increase, the difference in quality provided by the firms decreases. Finally, quality dispersion among firms increases in markets with a larger number of consumers, because there are greater rents from differentiating one's product.
Substituting the optimal quality levels (5) into the profit functions for each firm and rearranging yields the corresponding profits of the two firms when prices and qualities have been chosen optimally,
These are now a function only of green investment levels I H and I L .
Green Technology Investment
In this section we examine the first stage, where firms determine the level of technology investment. Denoting the unit costs of this investment by v, the profit functions corresponding to the maximization problem in the first stage can be expressed as,
where the indirect profit functions for high and low quality firms (8) are given by (7a) and (7b), respectively. The parameter ↑ represents the marginal cost of adopting a unit of investment in the green technology.
), investments do not change the relative costs of quality provision, and the latter RHS term in brackets would be zero and the firms' profits identical. Then the critical value of marginal willingness to pay would be defined as ) ( 2 1°°°Η Ζ , and the firms would split the market into two segments of equal size. This is equivalent to the result found in Crampes and Hollander (1995) . 7 It is reasonable to expect the costs of investment (adoption) are equal for both firms given a competitive investment market for capital.
Any level of investment in green technology has two possible effects. It lowers the costs of providing environmental quality (see (2)), and it may also increase consumers' marginal willingness to pay. Consequently, we analyze cases where marginal willingness to pay is both independent and dependent on the level of investment in the green technology.
Willingness to Pay Independent of Investment
Consider first the case where the upper and lower bounds on marginal willingness to pay for quality, ° and °, are independent of investment. The interpretation is that firms cannot influence demand by their investments. Investment in the green technology is then determined via the following first-order conditions, using (8),
where the terms 0 Ζ H°a nd 0 Ζ L° identify this as the case where consumer willingness to pay is independent of investment for both firms. In the Appendix we show that the investment game equilibrium is unique and stable provided that the cost function for producing quality is convex enough in investments. Moreover, we demonstrate that investments are strategic substitutes, which means the marginal profits of one firm are declining in the investments of the other firm.
Equations (9a) and (9b) show each firm invests so as to equate the marginal benefit of investment, in terms of reduced costs of providing quality (term in brackets), to the unit cost of investment v. Given the unit cost is investment is equal for both firms, we cannot say which firm will invest more in equilibrium. This is because the bracketed term is smaller in (9a) than The notion here is that consumers may pay more to purchase from firms that make green investments. Its justification comes from regarding investment in quality as a product characteristic which increases utilities of consumers (see Garella and Lambertini 1999 and Bontems and Requillart (2001) for examples in the case without investment).
Reasonably, investment by the high quality firm is assumed to be more effective on the upper limit of marginal willingness to pay, while investment by the low quality firm is more effective on the lower limit of marginal willingness to pay. This makes sense given that the demand for each firm is satisfied by a separate group of consumers. A fully covered market also requires that the number of consumers remains constant, so that investment raises the willingness to pay for quality by existing consumers. . Holding the number of consumers constant reflects full market coverage and allows us to separate the impacts of changes in willingness to pay on firms' behavior (e.g., Anderson et al. 1992, pp. 69-70) .
Changes in willingness to pay will obviously affect the profits of high and low quality firms differently. For example, as the marginal willingness to pay for quality increases, then we would expect that profits of the low quality firm will decrease, but those of the high quality firm will increase. We now show this and examine its implications for the firms' investment decisions.
When willingness to pay depends on investments, the first-order conditions corresponding to (9a) and (9b) become, (10a) and (10b) corresponds to the RHS terms of (9a) and (9b). These, recall, measure the marginal net benefit of technology investment when willingness to pay is constant: for each firm this is the marginal benefit in terms of reduction in costs of providing quality, net of investment costs. The second RHS term in (10a) and (10b) is a new modification indicating how changes in willingness to pay from investment affect the profits of firms. Each first order condition shows that firms invest to balance marginal benefits in terms of lower costs of providing quality with the marginal impacts on profits of corresponding increases in consumer willingness to pay. Obviously, the new terms suggest that incentives to invest are lower for the low quality firm, but higher for the high quality firm in this case.
This leads us to an interesting new result concerning green investment. Investment by the high quality firm will be greater than in the absence of the positive effect on the marginal willingness to pay for the goods, but investment by the low quality firm will be lower.
Intuitively, if investment in high quality goods increases consumer marginal willingness to pay, it becomes more profitable to invest for the high quality firm. But the low quality firm gains rents by differentiating prices away from the high quality firm (i.e., to relax price competition and increase profits), and thus it invests less in this case. This can be seen by noting the presence of the °term in equations (4a) and (4b). 
Socially Optimal Versus Profit-Maximizing Quality and Investment Decisions
The equilibrium characterized above is the result of profit maximizing decisions by firms and does not necessarily represent the social optimum. We now consider first best levels of investment as a means for comparison.
First Best Investment and Quality
The first best levels of technology investment and environmental quality provision are those that maximize social welfare. Social welfare is the sum of consumer and producer surplus (e.g., see Cremer and Thisse 1999),
where v is again the unit cost of investment and we have substituted in the cost function (2).
Following the literature, the third stage of the social planner's problem simply has optimal prices set equal to marginal cost (there is no price competition). The index of the marginal consumer, indifferent between consuming high and low quality goods, is then 2°°°Η Ζ .
Willingness to Pay Independent of Investment
To retain consistency, we first examine differences in quality provided by the two firms under the social welfare maximizing case, and then compare this with the profit maximizing . This describes the socially optimal difference in qualities provided by each firm in the absence of any green technology investment.
The following relationship therefore holds comparing the social welfare maximizing qualities with profit maximizing qualities from (5),
10 It also can be shown that allowing for the effect of investment on the marginal willingness to pay of consumers strengthens the strategic complementarity between investments of high and low quality firms. The stability analysis proceeds along the similar lines as in the earlier case (see Appendix 1).
where '*' continues to denote the firm's profit maximizing outcomes. Clearly,
indicating that the spread of quality among firms in the profit maximizing case is too large compared to the social welfare maximizing case, as previously shown.
The difference in quality dispersion between social welfare and profit maximizing cases is easy to explain. In the profit maximizing case, recall that equation (4a) shows the high quality firm captures rents through greater price differentiation brought about by increased investment. The low quality firm captures similar rents, but only by differentiating its product in the other direction, i.e., through lower quality provision (i.e., see the quality spread L H s s ϑ in (4b)). Society does not have these objectives given it seeks to maximize social surplus and not just the firm's profits. Thus, quality provided by the high quality firm is higher in the profit maximizing outcome relative to the social optimum. However, it is worth noting that the environmental quality provided by the low quality firm is still higher at the social optimum than in the profit maximizing case.
Next we consider the socially optimal level of green technology investment, proceeding as if society chooses this investment to maximize social welfare. To do this we substitute the socially optimal quality levels above into the social welfare function (11), and then obtain first order conditions for investment by high and low quality firms,
where we have used
(m < 1) for notational convenience, which simply implies the firms are not close to being identical. Solving these for the marginal consumer, above which all consumers purchase high quality goods and below which all consumers purchase low quality goods, gives (see Appendix 2),
As m increases, the marginal taste parameter decreases, 0 ) ( Ψ 〈 m°, and more consumers will purchase from the high quality firm at the social optimum. Hence, the socially optimal quality We can now formally compare investment in the social welfare and profit maximizing cases, making use of the marginal consumer in (14) and examining the first stage investment decision. Unfortunately, there is no closed form solution to the investment game in this case of exogenous willingness to pay with the cost function given in (2). However, if we use a quadratic version for costs of providing quality that is most often found in the quality differentiation literature (e.g., Cramer and Thisse, 1994), 11 we can show that the high quality firm overinvests in the green technology under profit maximization relative to the social welfare level of investment,
, where 'W' refers to the social welfare optimum. This can be seen by the following expression, proven in the appendix, which shows the marginal effect of investment on the firm's indirect profits at the social welfare optimum,
where n < 1.
The reasons for overinvestment by the high quality firm are similar to those we argued for overprovision of quality, namely that in a duopoly the high quality firm accrues rents by investing aggressively, thereby differentiating its product and obtaining higher prices relative to the low quality firm.
We would expect underinvestment by the low quality firm in profit maximization relative to the social optimum. However, to obtain this result we would need to show that
. In Appendix 2, we show that there are certain parametric restrictions that must be satisfied for this to be true. Under these parameters, it is the case that
. Recall this firm has high costs of quality provision, and thus it underinvests to relax price competition with the high cost firm; this maximizes the low quality firm's profits.
The motivation for the behavior of high and low quality firms above comes from noting that investment differences lead to environmental quality differences, and these differences lead to increased market prices from (4a) -(4b). From the perspective of society, this all means that the resulting spread in investment becomes too large in the profit maximization case relative to the social welfare optimum.
Willingness to Pay Dependent on Investment
Returning to the assumption that costs of quality are given by (2) . In order to simplify the analysis we also employ an additional assumption that H bs [°. This is a common assumption in the vertical product differentiation literature and simply means the marginal willingness to pay of a consumer with the least intensive preference for quality exceeds the increment in marginal cost of achieving the highest quality level. 12 We can again form the social welfare maximization problem under endogenous marginal willingness to pay, substitute for the optimal quality levels, and then obtain marginal conditions explaining how investment affects social welfare. The relevant conditions are,
. In equations (16a-b) we readily see . There are two observations that follow. First, the social welfare optimum has both firms investing more than their investment levels in the profit maximizing case, a fact that comes from comparing (16a) and (16b) with (13). Second, the high quality firm's investment in the social welfare optimum increases over its profit maximizing level by more than the low quality firm. This follows from the fact that the marginal reduction in costs of providing quality (eqn 2) is larger for the high quality firm's investment, i.e., 11 This cost function relies on the following modification of (2): 
Externalities and Social Welfare
The profit maximizing cases above all involve different levels of quality. We now consider the presence of an explicit externality related to low average environmental quality provided in the market. The interpretation is that consumers receive disutility from low quality, because these products would have been produced by firms making investments in green technologies which are too small, from society's perspective.
We include a (symmetric) externality in a standard way, following the product differentiation literature where investment is omitted, by assuming the utility of each consumer is rewritten (see Cremer and Thisse, 1999) ,
where the superscript 'e' denotes the presence of an externality, and ' a s 'denotes average market product quality, i.e., .
Because a single consumer cannot affect the average quality, the externality term will be a constant in any individual's optimization problem. It will not be a constant, though, when the social optimum will be determined. With ƒ >0 external costs imposed on each consumer a i s ƒ° increase as average quality decreases.
Using (17), the social welfare function in (11) is now modified as follows, ( 18) where (.) a c comes from equation (2) evaluated at the average quality point, and °remains as defined in (11).
Turning first to the second stage quality game, we differentiate (18) with respect to high and low quality levels, for a given investment, and find, ) 4 1 ( 
Immediately we see that the high quality firm should produce more at the social optimum, and more importantly, as the external cost of disutility due to low average quality increases, the quality provided by both firms should increase. The marginal increase in both high and low quality levels with respect to an increase in the external cost is equal,
implying that the socially optimal quality provided by both firms increases to equal extents.
Thus, the spread of environmental quality between high and low quality firms at the social optimum is unaffected by the externality, but environmental quality provided by each firm should be higher. This occurs because the externality is symmetric, and so the externality impacts high and low quality consumers equally.
13
It is only natural that firms should have to adjust environmental quality to equal degrees for both groups of consumers in order to reach social efficiency.
More intuition can be gained by comparing the optimal qualities across the various equilibria. We are specifically interested in finding cases where there is underprovision of quality in the duopoly equilibrium relative to the social welfare maximum. Interestingly, this depends on the size of the externality and cost differences between the firms, among other things. Our first result concerns the high quality firm: where this condition refers to the last inequality. This suggests that underprovision of quality is more likely as the external cost increases (the first LHS term increases). If external costs are high, then the social welfare maximum will be consistent with high quality provision by this firm as a means of increasing consumer utility. But this means that the likelihood is higher that the firm will not differentiate as much in the duopoly equilibrium. The condition also depends on the differences in the costs between firms, measured by the x term. Recall as x increases in absolute value, the high quality firm is relatively more efficient in providing quality for a given level of investment. This implies, from (4), that the costs of differentiating its product in the direction of high quality are lower. Underprovision is less likely in this case, because this firm will differentiate more in the duopoly equilibrium given its costs to doing so are lower.
Similarly, for the low quality firm we can derive the following result:
where this condition refers to the last inequality. Again underprovision of quality by the low quality firm is conditional upon the size of the market, embodied in ) (°°ϑ , as well as the differences in the effect of investment on the costs of quality provision between the firms, x, and a parameter related to costs of quality provision b. As the difference in costs increases, this implies the low quality firm is less efficient (has higher costs), so there are lower gains from raising quality in the duopoly equilibrium. As the size of the market increases, however, this condition is more likely satisfied, as the rents to increasing quality would be higher in a marginal sense. Finally as the costs of quality provision increase, b increases and, as we would expect, the low quality firm will invest less, making the condition more likely to hold. It is worth noting that the low quality firm's underprovision is even greater than the case without externalities, because recall we showed earlier that
The results in (20) and (21) represent a basic difference with previous product differentiation models, which repeatedly demonstrate overprovision of quality by firms when maximizing profits, relative to the socially optimal level. Our findings differ for two reasons.
First, an externality of sufficient size pushes higher the quality levels of all firms in the social optimum given the disutility of low quality vis (17). If this external cost is high enough, the level of environmental quality that the social planner would seek to provide is higher than the quality that results when firms seek to differentiate products. Achieving too high a level of quality in profit maximization requires costly investments by firms in our model (see (2)), given that we have specifically included investment in the green technology, and given that this investment effects costs of quality provision. As a result, fairly restrictive conditions concerning the firms' costs and gains from differentiation must be satisfied, or firms will underprovide quality in a duopoly.
We now consider investment in the presence of an externality for the most interesting case in which marginal willingness to pay depends on investment. Substituting the optimal qualities from (19) into the social welfare function (18) and finding first order condition for high quality firm's investment gives,
where SW represents the social welfare function when an externality is absent (see eq. 11).
The additional term in (22a) is positive, indicating that investment of the high quality firm should be higher at the social optimum in the case of an externality. For the low quality firm, we cannot tell whether investment is higher or lower in the externality case.
The external cost is declining in average quality, so that increasing green investments by the higher quality firm will increase consumer surplus the most, reducing external costs.
This higher quality firm's investment also reduces costs of providing environmental quality and production of high average quality, further increasing social welfare when this firm invests more. This is because the higher quality firm's objective of differentiating its product, through higher environmental quality provision, is somewhat consistent with Society's objective of increasing environmental quality to lower external costs to consumers.
Conclusions
In most market settings, there has been considerable emphasis placed on understanding investments firms make in technologies used to produce goods or reduce pollution associated with production. At the same time there have been numerous empirical examples of firms that undertake ecolabeling as a product differentiation strategy. The technology investment choice is important to understanding eco-labeling, because obtaining the label usually requires investment in abatement technologies or upgrades of existing production processes. Such investments can also be socially desirable because they lead to increased environmental quality of goods. Consumers may value this, so that investment might increase willingness to pay for these goods. Despite the obvious connection between technologies and ecolabeling, and the relevance of ecolabeling to quality competition, there has been no attention devoted to understanding how the two are related in either the product differentiation literature or the environmental literature.
Using the product differentiation literature as a starting point, we introduce the choice of investment in a green technology for firms, made prior to the quality and price competition decisions typically studied. We do this for a duopoly, where firms differ in the level and cost of providing environmental quality. The cost of providing environmental quality for each firm depends on their level of investment in a green technology and the level of quality chosen. A three stage Nash game is solved: in the first stage, each firm chooses the level of their green technology investment. The remaining second and third stages involve quality and price setting games. The resulting duopoly solution is compared to the socially first best solution. We also allow for externalities related to how "green" (or dirty) products are in the market, and we consider cases where consumer willingness to pay does and does not depend on firms' investments in green technologies. As we show repeatedly, allowing for a technology choice overturns much of the conventional wisdom drawn from product differentiation models.
Our new results suggest, unlike other models, that there may be scope for government intervention. These are summarized in Figure 1 and Table 1 . Previous work suggests that regulatory enforcement may not be needed when a government wants to impose minimum quality regulation and externalities are present, at least for high quality firms because they tend to overprovide quality, relative to the social optimum, when maximizing profits. We show this is not the case when investment is included and externalities are present. High quality firms may not overinvest or overprovide quality in green technologies or in environmental quality to satisfy eco-labeling criteria. Thus, government intervention cannot be ruled out in our model.
When externalities are absent, the scope for government intervention is quite different.
Harmonization of policies across firms may not be socially efficient. This is because high quality firms will always overinvest in the green technology when maximizing profits, relative to the social optimum, when externalities related to environmental quality of production are absent.
In cases where the government should intervene, the choice between the type of policy instruments depends on differences we uncover between behavior of high and low quality firms. For a government wishing to encourage green investment and eco-labeling, it is important to recognize that high and low quality firms will respond differently to investment incentives or taxes given their different abilities to capture rents through price and quality competition, especially when consumer willingness to pay depends on green investments.
When externalities are not present, then the government should discourage high quality firms' investment while encouraging investment by low quality firms. This brings market quality differentials back in line with efficiency, thereby removing incentives for increased price competition (which reduces consumer welfare). When the firm can affect consumer marginal willingness to pay for quality, then the spread of quality resulting in competition increases again (see Figure 1) as the high quality firm overinvests in quality under profit maximization relative to the social optimum. Thus, a government wishing to encourage investment might instead find ways to encourage increases in consumer demand and willingness to pay for the high quality firm's product. The government, however, should encourage the actual investment of low quality firms.
It is worth noting that we have conducted our analysis assuming consumers observe the quality and investment levels of firms, and firms observe preferences of consumers. Besides being consistent with most of the vertical differentiation literature that studies quality
competition. An interesting area for further research would be to allow for asymmetric information between firms and consumers about environmental qualities of firms' products.
This would involve considering ecolabeling as a signal for consumers.
Notation used in the paper k = H,L Index of technology for high quality/low cost (H) and low quality/high cost (L) cost firms b
Marginal cost parameter for provision of environmental quality by firm k = H,L, for marginal costs that depend on environmental quality levels, s k .
Marginal cost parameter for provision of environmental quality of goods for costs that are independent of environmental quality levels but dependent on investment. s k Imputed environmental quality of goods provided in second stage c k (s k ,I k ) Total cost of providing quality for the high quality/low cost firm (k = H) and low quality/high cost firm (k = L) p k Price of goods, for low quality (k = L) and high quality (k = H) p* k Optimal (Bertrand) prices from third stage price competition for high and low quality goods u i
Utility of consumer i ↓ k Profit function for low quality/high cost (k = L) and high quality/ low cost (k = H) firms Difference in marginal costs that do not depend on quality levels,
i°=°C onsumer i's taste parameter, i.e., marginal willingness to pay for good°ˆT hreshold taste parameter for consumer who is indifferent between consumption of high and low environmental quality goods°U pper bound on consumers' marginal willingness to pay for environmental quality°L ower bound on consumers' marginal willingness to pay for environmental quality°I ndex of marginal consumer when both high and low quality goods are sold at marginal cost I Re-express the first-order conditions for the investment game as follows: The second-order conditions and the cross-derivatives are
Equation (A5) indicates that the firm's investments in greener technology are strategic substitutes.
Stability and uniqueness of the investment game requires that the condition
holds for the optimum. Applying equations (A3) -(A5) to this condition yields after some manipulation:
By rearranging we get
This gives as the sufficient condition for a unique and stable equilibrium, i.e., for 0 [ α : 
One can see from (A7') that if k ∼ is concave enough (i.e. if the cost function is convex enough), then the sufficient condition (A7') for stability of the investment game holds.
B. Willingness to Pay Dependent on Investment
Recall the first-order conditions are: The negativity of (A12) results directly from our assumptions and it shows that the dependence of the marginal willingness to pay reinforces the strategic substitutability of investments.
The stability condition is given by 
The proof of this follows the previous procedure.
Appendix 2. Proofs of Social Welfare Maximizing Quality and Investment Levels
The proof of this in the case of willingness to pay that is dependent on green technology investment is given in the text. We therefore focus on the proof in the case of willingness to pay that is independent of investment. As a precursor, we first consider a social welfare function without investment, which in our setting is equivalent to using total surplus, Next we demonstrate the sign of equation (16), which describes the relationship between the socially optimal investment of the high quality firm and the profit-maximizing investment level. As noted in the text, if we follow most of the product differentiation literature and make a standard quadratic cost form assumption, we would write ∼ k (.)in (2) as I ,we must evaluate the relative magnitudes of the first and the second term in brackets. his provides parametric restrictions under which the low quality firm underinvests in profit maximization compared to the social welfare optimum. *****
